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Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination Instead of Separation

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  • Thorsten Beck
  • Daniel Gros

Abstract

Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the �Single Supervisory Mechanism� (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be �Chinese walls� between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be �independents� in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.
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Suggested Citation

  • Thorsten Beck & Daniel Gros, 2012. "Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination Instead of Separation," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 33-39, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifofor:v:13:y:2012:i:04:p:33-39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
    2. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    3. Mr. Richard K. Abrams & Mr. Michael W Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 2000/213, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Jiménez, Gabriel & Ongena, Steven & Peydró, José-Luis & Saurina, Jesús, 2012. "Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 102(5), pages 2301-2326.
    5. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    6. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Markus Demary, 2013. "How Should the European Banking Supervisory Authority Deal with Undercapitalised Banks?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(24), pages 11-14, December.
    2. Remsperger, Hermann, 2014. "Der makroprudenzielle Komplex: Der Prozess, das Schloss, das Urteil," SAFE White Paper Series 17, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Zuzanna Urbanowicz, 2015. "Nieadekwatność polityki pieniężnej Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w procesie stabilizacji makroekonomicznej w strefie euro," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 4, pages 5-25.
    4. Doumpos, Michael & Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2015. "Central bank independence, financial supervision structure and bank soundness: An empirical analysis around the crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(S1), pages 69-83.
    5. Maylis Avaro & Henri Sterdyniak, 2014. "Banking union: a solution to the euro zone crisis?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 193-241.
    6. Smeets Heinz-Dieter & Schmid Anita, 2014. "Europäische Staatsschuldenkrise, Lender of last resort und Bankenunion / European sovereign debt crisis, lender of last resort and banking union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 47-74, January.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/144pedpca18ff8v7fh3tvnp99m is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Stanislav Šaroch & Jan Famfule, 2017. "European Banking Uniion: Current State of Play and How to Fix Its Weaknesses [Evropská bankovní unie: Současný stav a jak napravit její slabiny]," Současná Evropa, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(1), pages 17-29.
    9. Hobelsberger, Karin & Kok, Christoffer & Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2022. "A tale of three crises: synergies between ECB tasks," Occasional Paper Series 305, European Central Bank.
    10. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Pasiouras, Fotios & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2021. "Allocating supervisory responsibilities to central bankers: Does national culture matter?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/f6h8764enu2lskk9p4srjesb4 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2013. "Die neue europäische Bankenaufsicht: Eine kritische Würdigung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 45, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banken; Europäische Integration; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion; Europäische Bankenunion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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