Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core vs Periphery Problem
AbstractI argue that the eurozoneÃâs current problems are primarily structural: A weak central bank; the absence of fiscal coordination; fragmented bank supervision with individual countries having the ultimate responsibility for supporting banks but without the ability to print their own currency. At the same time, European elites of the core have been driven by very short-term objectives whereas the Greek and Irish governments have shown no appetite to represent their own citizens in negotiations. In the absence of any moves towards political integration and to avoid a probable disorderly exit, it is critical to formally establish an opt-out clause for exit from the eurozone and, in the meantime, rapidly prepare procedures for such an exit.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal CESifo Forum.
Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Geldpolitik; Finanzpolitik; Öffentliche Schulden; Eurozone; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion;
Other versions of this item:
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core Vs. Perifphery Problem," Working Papers 101112, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Kevin H. O'Rourke, 2009. "A Tale of Two Trilemmas," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp364, IIIS.
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