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Wahlkampf auf Gemeindekosten: Politische Budgetzyklen in sächsischen Gemeinden

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Kluge
  • Gunther Markwardt

Abstract

Gewählte Lokalpolitiker befinden sich häufig in einem Zielkonflikt: Einerseits wollen sie verantwortungs - volle politische Entscheidungen treffen. Andererseits haben Mandatsträger auch ein Wiederwahlinteresse. Beide Ziele können vereinbar sein; mitunter sind sie aber nicht in Einklang zu bringen. Politiker haben die Möglichkeit, z. B. das öffentliche Budget in einer Weise zu verwenden, die ihnen unmittelbar vor Wahl - terminen die Gunst der Wähler einträgt. So lassen sich notwendige Investitionen, z. B. in die Infrastruktur oder die öffentliche Kinderbetreuung, um einige Zeit verschieben, um sie an den Wahlkalender anzupassen. Dadurch können politische Budgetzyklen entstehen, indem die Ausgaben vor und in Wahljahren steigen und nach den Wahlen wieder zurückgefahren werden. In unserer Untersuchung für die sächsischen Gemeinden im Zeitraum von 1994 bis 2010 finden wir, dass insbesondere Parteien, die eine absolute Mehrheit im Gemeinderat haben und daher Budgetentscheidungen im Alleingang treffen können, dazu neigen, politische Budgetzyklen zu verursachen. Bei stärkerem politischem Wettbewerb in den Gemeinderäten kontrollieren sich die Parteien gegenseitig; daher sind in solchen Gemeinden keine wahlbezogenen Zyklen zu beobachten.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Kluge & Gunther Markwardt, 2015. "Wahlkampf auf Gemeindekosten: Politische Budgetzyklen in sächsischen Gemeinden," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 22(05), pages 17-24, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodre:v:22:y:2015:i:05:p:17-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

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