Do Strict Electoral Campaign Finance Rules Limit Corruption?
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Article provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal DICE.
Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 24-27
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Related research
Keywords: Wahlkampffinanzierung; Parteienfinanzierung; Korruption; Österreich; Frankreich; Deutschland; Japan; ; Vereinigte Staaten; Campaign finance; Party finance; Corruption; Austria; France; Germany; United States;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
References
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- Stephen Coate, 2003. "Power-hungry Candidates, Policy Favors, and Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy," NBER Working Papers 9601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1044, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Björn Frank, 2004. "Zehn Jahre empirische Korruptionsforschung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 184-199.
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