Using the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a case study, this paper examines how conflicting objectives in procurement policies by public space agencies result in anti-competitive procurement. Globally, public sectors have actively encouraged mergers and acquisitions of major contractors at the national level, since the end of the “Cold War”, following largely from the perceived benefits of economies of size. The paper examines the impact the resulting industrial concentration has on the ability of space agencies to follow a pro-competitive procurement policy. Using time series econometric analysis, the paper shows that NASA’s pro-competitive policy is unsuccessful due to a shift, since the mid-1990s, in the share of appropriations in favour of its top contractors.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General