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Hooligans

Author

Listed:
  • Peter T. Leeson
  • Daniel J. Smith
  • Nicholas A. Snow

Abstract

This paper analyzes hooligans: rival football fans bent on brawling. It develops a simple theory of hooligans as rational agents. We model hooligans as persons who derive utility from conflict. Legal penalties for conflicting with non-hooligans drive hooligans to form a kind of ?fight club? where they fight only one another. This club makes it possible for hooligans to realize gains from trade. But it attracts ultra-violent persons we call ?sadists?. If the proportion of fight-club members who are sadists grows sufficiently high, the fight club self-destructs. Rules that regulate the form club conflict can take, but don?t eliminate conflict, can prevent the club from self-destructing even when populated exclusively by sadists. This creates strong pressure for private rules that regulate conflict to emerge within the club. To illustrate our theory we examine the private rules that developed for this purpose among English football hooligans.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & Daniel J. Smith & Nicholas A. Snow, 2012. "Hooligans," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 213-231.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_218_0213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    8. Peter T. Leeson, 2009. "The Laws of Lawlessness," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 471-503, June.
    9. Peter Leeson, 2009. "The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 443-459, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Domizio Marco & Caruso Raul, 2015. "Hooliganism and Demand for Football in Italy: Attendance and Counterviolence Policy Evaluation," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 123-137, May.
    2. Raul Caruso & Marco Di Domizio & David A. Savage, 2015. "Hic Sunt Leones! The role of national identity on aggressiveness between national football teams," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0076, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    3. Raul Caruso & Marco Di Domizio, 2013. "International hostility and aggressiveness on the soccer pitch: Evidence from European Championships and World Cups for the period 2000–2012," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 16(3), pages 262-273, September.
    4. Carl Mildenberger, 2015. "Virtual world order: the economics and organizations of virtual pirates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 401-421, September.
    5. Leonid Krasnozhon & John Levendis, 2018. "Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 75-90, February.
    6. Raul Caruso & Marco Di Domizio & David A. Savage, 2017. "Differences in National Identity, Violence and Conflict in International Sport Tournaments: Hic Sunt Leones!," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 511-545, November.
    7. Caruso, Raul & Di Domizio, Marco, 2013. "International hostility and aggressiveness on the soccer pitch Evidence from European Championships and World Cups for the period 2000-2012," MPRA Paper 50099, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Mildenberger, Carl David, 2018. "Spontaneous disorder: conflict-kindling institutions in virtual worlds," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 787-809, October.

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