Règles de responsabilité civile et prévention des risques environnementaux
AbstractThis article analyses how tort law can induce socially optimal level of environmental accident prevention. First, we review the major environmental liability regimes in the United States and in the European Union and give a classification of environmental damages. Secondly, we analyse the relative efficiency of the strict liability and the negligence rules in depth. The analysis is done assuming that all parties are risk neutral, information is perfect and the potential injurer is solvent. Then the role of risk attitude, insolvency of the responsible party and imperfect information is considered.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.
Volume (Year): Volume 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm
environmental risk; information asymmetries; prevention; tort liability;
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