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La politique monétaire sans monnaie

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  • Jérôme Creel
  • Henri Sterdyniak

Abstract

Le schéma traditionnel de la courbe LM où le taux d’intérêt équilibre une demande de monnaie stable et une offre de monnaie fixée par la banque centrale n’a plus de sens dans les systèmes financiers modernes caractérisés par la disparition de la distinction entre actifs monétaires et non-monétaires. La banque centrale fixe à chaque période le taux d’intérêt monétaire; la masse monétaire, quelle que soit sa définition arbitraire, est déterminée par la demande de monnaie; le taux d’inflation est déterminé, période après période, par le comportement conjoint de la banque centrale, des autorités budgétaires et du secteur privé; la notion de financement monétaire du déficit public disparaît (...).

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): n° 70 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 111-153

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Handle: RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_p1999_70n1_0111

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Cited by:
  1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5122 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2943 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Jérôme Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 2000. "La théorie budgétaire du niveau des prix, un bilan critique," Sciences Po publications 2000-03, Sciences Po.
  4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2942 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Jérôme Creel & Jacky Fayolle, 2002. "La Banque centrale et l'Union monétaire européennes : les tribulations de la crédibilité," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 211-244.
  6. Jérôme Creel, 2001. "Faut-il contraindre la politique budgétaire en union monétaire ? Les enseignements d’une maquette simulée," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2943, Sciences Po.

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