Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies
AbstractThis paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium. JEL Classification : D43, D51
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.
Volume (Year): 76 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm
general equilibrium; oligopolistic competition;
Other versions of this item:
- Ludovic A. Julien & Fabrice Tricou, 2010. "Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2010023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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