This article studies the role of an exclusive social insurance as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal linear income tax. Agents differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. In case of illness, they suffer a health care expenditure and an income loss. The purpose is to determine the conditions under which a uniform health care coverage and an individual income based on personal income allow income redistribution. Is a complete social insurance optimal?
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BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2001.
"Social insurance and redistribution,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Robin Boadway & Manuel Leite-Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2002.
"Social Insurance and Redistribution,"
Working Papers
1004, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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