Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées
AbstractThis article analyses instruments which are available to the government to correct environmental externalities. We assume that only the government has access to environmental maintenance activity, which is financed by levying taxes. The competitive equilibrium is therefore not optimal because the economy faces (i) a problem of public good supply, i.e. the maintenance activity, (ii) a pollution externality from private consumption, (iii) the selfishness of the short lived agents. We determine the optimal fiscal structure that allows the competitive equilibrium and the optimum to coincide. To determine the optimal level of environmental maintenance, we use the Samuelson rule, modified to take into account the relevant social rate of discount that incorporates the natural rate of depletion. We show that the considered optimal maintenance activity should not only neutralize the flow of emissions of pollutants but also increases the environmental quality. Otherwise, in the long run, the environmental amenities would disappear.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.
Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Mouez FODHA, 2005. "Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Mouez Fodha, 2005. "Maintenance environnementale et politique fiscale optimale dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00275107, HAL.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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