Retraite par répartition et âge de la retraite
Abstract[eng] In this paper, we explain why the old manage to obtain favourable pension policies whereas they belong to a minority in the population. The argument relies on the multidimensional nature of the political process. Indeed, we consider a two-dimensional collective choice problem. The first of these choices is the level of the contribution rate to the Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The second is a non economic decision, unrelated to the pension system. Using a political agency model, we show that, as soon as the retirees are sufficiently numerous, the equilibrium tax rate may be higher than the tax rate preferred by the young, who yet constitute a majority in the population. [fre] Cet article explique pourquoi les travailleurs cessent toute activitÃ© de plus en plus tÃ´t alors qu'au travers du systÃ¨me de retraite par rÃ©partition la sociÃ©tÃ© s'endette de plus en plus. Pour ce faire, nous adoptons un modÃ¨le Ã gÃ©nÃ©rations imbriquÃ©es avec production et participation endogÃ¨ne au marchÃ© du travail pendant la seconde pÃ©riode de vie. Nous montrons que cette participation dÃ©croÃ®t si la retraite par rÃ©partition augmente. Nous montrons aussi qu'en cas de sous-accumulation, imposer une retraite prÃ©coce peut Ãªtre socialement souhaitable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): n° 51 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm
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- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00185314 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00185314 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bruno DECREUSE & Bertrand WIGNIOLLE, 2006.
Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain)
2006013, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Cheron, Arnaud & Khaskhoussi, Fouad & Khaskhoussi, Tarek & Langot, François, 2004. "Voluntary and involuntary retirement decision : does real wage rigidity affects the effectiveness of pension reforms ?," MPRA Paper 9119, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vincent Touzé, 2005. "Fiscal incidence of unfunded pension system: an analytical investigation," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2005-03, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00452561 is not listed on IDEAS
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