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Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk

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  • Bernard Ruffieux
  • Stéphane Robin
  • Claude Meidinger

Abstract

[fre] Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk. . La microéconomie standard donne une vision particulière des relations de confiance : elles ne peuvent exister sans mécanisme incitatif. Dans un cadre expérimental où aucun support incitatif de la théorie standard n'est présent et où la confiance permet un gain mutuel, le jeu dynamique de l'investissement montre que certains individus sont disposés à faire confiance et que d'autres sont incités à la réciprocité en présence de manifestations de confiance. Un modèle de jeu statique, reposant sur un concept d'équilibre de bienveillance réciproque, révèle une situa­tion d'information incomplète et éclaire les comportements des joueurs. Une seconde expérience introduit une communication cheap talk. Les résultats confirment l'existence d'informations incomplètes et révèlent les difficultés que rencontrent les joueurs à se coordonner sur des issues Pareto-optimales. [eng] Trust, reciprocity, and cheap talk. . Standard microeconomics implies a particular view of trust between agents: it can only exist under incentive mechanisms. In the experiment reported in this paper, the Dynamic Investment Game, in which such standard incentive mechanisms are not present but in which trust can lead to mutual gains, we find that certain individuals exhibit trust and thereby induce others to reciprocate. A static game theoretic model with incomplete information which contains a concept of fairness equilibrium more accurately describes behaviour in the experiment than the standard model. We further study behavior in this game with a second series of experiments in which cheap talk is permitted. Our results confirm the existence of incomplete information and reveal certain difficulties in coordinating on Pareto-optimal equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): n° 50 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 5-44

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_p1999_50n1_0005

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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
  2. Claudia Keser, 2002. "Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-75, CIRANO.

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