Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk
Abstract[fre] Confiance, rÃ©ciprocitÃ© et cheap talk. . La microÃ©conomie standard donne une vision particuliÃ¨re des relations de confiance : elles ne peuvent exister sans mÃ©canisme incitatif. Dans un cadre expÃ©rimental oÃ¹ aucun support incitatif de la thÃ©orie standard n'est prÃ©sent et oÃ¹ la confiance permet un gain mutuel, le jeu dynamique de l'investissement montre que certains individus sont disposÃ©s Ã faire confiance et que d'autres sont incitÃ©s Ã la rÃ©ciprocitÃ© en prÃ©sence de manifestations de confiance. Un modÃ¨le de jeu statique, reposant sur un concept d'Ã©quilibre de bienveillance rÃ©ciproque, rÃ©vÃ¨le une situaÂtion d'information incomplÃ¨te et Ã©claire les comportements des joueurs. Une seconde expÃ©rience introduit une communication cheap talk. Les rÃ©sultats confirment l'existence d'informations incomplÃ¨tes et rÃ©vÃ¨lent les difficultÃ©s que rencontrent les joueurs Ã se coordonner sur des issues Pareto-optimales. [eng] Trust, reciprocity, and cheap talk. . Standard microeconomics implies a particular view of trust between agents: it can only exist under incentive mechanisms. In the experiment reported in this paper, the Dynamic Investment Game, in which such standard incentive mechanisms are not present but in which trust can lead to mutual gains, we find that certain individuals exhibit trust and thereby induce others to reciprocate. A static game theoretic model with incomplete information which contains a concept of fairness equilibrium more accurately describes behaviour in the experiment than the standard model. We further study behavior in this game with a second series of experiments in which cheap talk is permitted. Our results confirm the existence of incomplete information and reveal certain difficulties in coordinating on Pareto-optimal equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): n° 50 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Claudia Keser, 2002. "Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-75, CIRANO.
- Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
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