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Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé

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Author Info

  • Florence Naegelen
  • Michel Mougeot

Abstract

[fre] Cet article considère les relations entre les hôpitaux et une autorité de tutelle (État ou assurance maladie) en situation de risque moral et d'antisélection lorsque la tutelle possède une fonction objectif quasi linéaire. Différents modes d'organisation sont envisagés : contrat bilatéral, concurrence par comparaison (tarification par pathologie) et achat de soins. Lorsque les trois procédures peuvent être mises en œuvre dans des conditions analogues, une hiérarchie est mise en évidence en faveur de l'achat de soins. [eng] In this paper, we consider the relations between a principal (a public agency or a private insurance company) and the hospitals. We suppose that the regulator utility function is quasilinear and that the regulator cannot observe the productivity parameter and the cost reduction effort of the hospitals. We prove that a bilateral contract is dominated by a yardstick competition mechanism and by an auction mechanism.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): n° 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1323-1343

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_p1998_49n5_1323

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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Jana Chvalkovská & Petr Janský & Jiří Skuhrovec, 2012. "Bearer Shares In Paper Form And Public Procurement," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(3), pages 349-361.
  2. Martin Janíčko & Ivo Koubek, 2012. "Information Assymetry And Double Standard In The Doctor-Patient Relationship," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(3), pages 362-379.

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