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Dissuasion de la collusion et efficacité de deux systèmes d'amendes

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  • Saïd Souam

Abstract

[eng] Collusion deterrence and efficiency of two regimes of fines. . Within a Principal Agent Model, we characterize the optimal policy of an agency in charge of competition policy. We consider a situation of asymmetric information concerning the cost of production between the agency and the industry to be controlled. Moreover, we consider two regimes of fines used in practice. The first one makes the fine a fixed proportion of the total sales. The second one makes the fine a multiple of the industry profit from colluding. We compare the two regimes in terms of deterrence levels and efficiency. [fre] Dissuasion de la collusion et efficacité de deux systèmes d'amendes. . Dans le cadre d'un modèle Principal-Agent, nous caractérisons la politique optimale des autorités de la concurrence (Principal) faisant face à une industrie (Agent). Pour cela, nous considérons une situation d'information asymétrique où les autorités ne disposent que d'un a priori sur les coûts de production de l'indus­trie. De plus, nous considérons deux systèmes d'amendes utilisés en pratique. Dans le premier système, l'amende est égale à un pourcentage donné du chiffre d'affaires. Dans le second, l'amende est égale à un multiple du profit engendré par la collusion. Nous comparons les deux systèmes en termes de niveaux de dissuasion et d'efficacité.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): n° 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 755-765

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_p1998_49n3_0755

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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Gilles Rotillon & Philippe Bontems, 2000. "Honnêteté et conformité environnementale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 117-127.
  2. Gianmaria MARTINI & Cinzia ROVESTI, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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