Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage
Abstract[fre] Dans cet article, on Ã©tudie l'arbitrage qui existe entre les Ã©conomies d'Ã©chelle associÃ©es Ã un monopole et le gain rÃ©alisÃ© sur le coÃ»t variable d'acquisition quand on dispose au contraire d'un Ã©chantillon plus important : l'effet d'Ã©chantillonnage. On Ã©tudie la structure de marchÃ© optimale (monopole ou duopole) issue de cet arbitrage quand les paramÃ¨tres de coÃ»t des entreprises sont indÃ©pendants mais diffÃ©remment distribuÃ©s. On montre que ce n'est pas nÃ©cessairement l'entreprise qui a un avantage technologique (au sens de la dominance stochastique) qui est sÃ©lectionnÃ©e Ã l'optimum d'information asymÃ©trique de monopole, pas plus que ce n'est l'entreprise eflicace (celle qui a le coÃ»t marginal bas) qui est choisie Ã l'optiÂmum de duopole. [eng] This paper analyses within a static model, the trade-off between the sampling advantage of duopolistic structures and the economies of scale of a monopoly. The duopoly structure provides a larger sample of producers that reduces expecÂted costs as the lowest of two possible total costs is used for final production - the sampling effect - but generates duplication of fixed costs. The optimal market structure (monopoly or duopoly) results from a trade-off between the fixed costs and the variable costs. Moreover since the firms are ex-ante asymmetric, it is not always the most efficient that produces at the optimum. The choice of the produÂcer is the result of a trade-off between variable and informational costs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): n° 47 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm
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- Auriol, E., 1998.
"Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase,"
98a29, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle, 1997.
"Deregulation and Quality,"
IDEI Working Papers
69, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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