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Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage

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  • Emmanuelle Auriol

Abstract

[fre] Dans cet article, on étudie l'arbitrage qui existe entre les économies d'échelle associées à un monopole et le gain réalisé sur le coût variable d'acquisition quand on dispose au contraire d'un échantillon plus important : l'effet d'échantillonnage. On étudie la structure de marché optimale (monopole ou duopole) issue de cet arbitrage quand les paramètres de coût des entreprises sont indépendants mais différemment distribués. On montre que ce n'est pas nécessairement l'entreprise qui a un avantage technologique (au sens de la dominance stochastique) qui est sélectionnée à l'optimum d'information asymétrique de monopole, pas plus que ce n'est l'entreprise eflicace (celle qui a le coût marginal bas) qui est choisie à l'opti­mum de duopole. [eng] This paper analyses within a static model, the trade-off between the sampling advantage of duopolistic structures and the economies of scale of a monopoly. The duopoly structure provides a larger sample of producers that reduces expec­ted costs as the lowest of two possible total costs is used for final production - the sampling effect - but generates duplication of fixed costs. The optimal market structure (monopoly or duopoly) results from a trade-off between the fixed costs and the variable costs. Moreover since the firms are ex-ante asymmetric, it is not always the most efficient that produces at the optimum. The choice of the produ­cer is the result of a trade-off between variable and informational costs.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): n° 47 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1179-1201

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_p1996_47n5_1179

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Cited by:
  1. Auriol, Emmanuelle, 1998. "Deregulation and quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 169-194, March.
  2. Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2006. "Corruption in procurement and public purchase," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 867-885, September.

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