Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favour of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where a planner chooses the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint reflecting households? choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations with instrumental variables. Countries with a failing legal system have higher levels of corruption, spend relatively more in physical capital than in education and health, and they grow slower, in particular if the political power is highly concentrated. Classification JEL : O41, H50, D73.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- DE LA CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, . "Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1990, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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- Simplice A, Asongu & Oasis, Kodila-Tedika, 2013.
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44043, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Asongu, Simplice A. & Kodila-Tedika, Oasis, 2013. "Crime and conflicts in Africa: consequences of corruption?," European Economic Letters, European Economics Letters Group, vol. 2(2), pages 50-55.
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"Fighting African Conflicts and Crimes: Which Governance Tools Matter?,"
13/007, African Governance and Development Institute..
- Simplice A, Asongu & Oasis, Kodila-Tedika, 2013. "Fighting African Conflicts and Crimes: Which Governance Tools Matter?," MPRA Paper 44044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- d'Agostino, Giorgio & Dunne, Paul J. & Pieroni, Luca, 2012.
"Government spending, corruption and economic growth,"
38109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- G. d'Agostino & J.P Dunne & L. Pieroni, 2012. "Government spending, corruption and economic growth," SALDRU Working Papers 74, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
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