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Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling

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  • Pierre Fleckinger
  • Thierry Lafay

Abstract

We study a duopoly on a market with horizontal differentiation where firms compete in catalog : firms choose a price and a location in the consumer? space. Whereas there is no equilibrium in pure strategy for the simultaneous game, we show that an equilibrium always exists in a sequential competition. In this subgame perfect equilibrium the leader chooses a more specific product at a lower price than the follower. Thus the leader earns finally less than the follower. This introduces a tension between the temptation of attrition, which leads to an unstable configuration, and the will to guarantee a stricly positive profit. Classification JEL : L11, H41, D43, M3.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 57 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 573-581

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0573

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  1. Nicholas Economides & Jamie Howell & Sergio Meza, 2002. "Does it Pay to be First? Sequential Locational Choice and Foreclosure," Working Papers 02-19, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. MACLEOD, W. Bentley, . "On the non-existence of equilibria in differentiated product models," CORE Discussion Papers RP -650, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Anderson, S., 1986. "Spatial competition and price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers 1986002, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Bester, Helmut & de Palma, Andre & Leininger, Wolfgang & Thomas, Jonathan & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1996. "A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 165-186, February.
  5. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "On Hotelling's "Stability in competition"," CORE Discussion Papers RP -385, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Gotz, Georg, 2005. "Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 249-261, April.
  7. Neven, Damien J., 1987. "Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 419-434.
  8. Hinloopen, Jeroen & van Marrewijk, Charles, 1999. "On the limits and possibilities of the principle of minimum differentiation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 735-750, July.
  9. Economides, Nicholas, 1984. "The principle of minimum differentiation revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 345-368, April.
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