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Sécurité des paiements et développement du commerce électronique

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  • David Bounie
  • Marc Bourreau

Abstract

This paper deals with the question of the security of the payments on Internet and proposes a formal framework to study its impact on the development of the electronic commerce. We show, within the framework of a competitive supply of the security of the payments, that a weak development of the trades can be attributed to the risk of fraud perceived by the ?honest consumers?, but not to the fraud of the ?opportunist consumers? which increases the traded quantities. We also show that, even if the level of security can be higher with a monopoly, a competition between suppliers of security is always (1) preferable to stimulate the development of the electronic commerce and (2) socially desirable. Classification JEL : L1 ; L86.

Suggested Citation

  • David Bounie & Marc Bourreau, 2004. "Sécurité des paiements et développement du commerce électronique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 55(4), pages 689-714.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_554_0689
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laurence Scialom, 1995. "Les modèles de paiements concurrentiels : éléments d'analyse critique ," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(1), pages 35-55.
    2. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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