Payment Systems Are Different: Shouldn't Their Regulation Be Too?
AbstractThis paper makes the case that the structure of payment systems is such that, in contrast to competition in normal markets, private incentives can encourage activities and pricing that do not necessarily improve social welfare. Furthermore, while there is usually a reasonable presumption that where arrangements do not breach antitrust laws they are efficient, this presumption does not necessarily carry over to payment systems. Thus, there is a case for the regulation of payment systems. In particular, the paper suggests that, because of the distinctive nature of payment systems, payment system specific regulation has a number of advantages over generic antitrust regulation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ching, Andrew T. & Hayashi, Fumiko, 2010.
"Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1773-1787, August.
- Ching, Andrew & Hayashi, Fumiko, 2008. "Payment Card Rewards Programs and Consumer Payment Choice," MPRA Paper 8458, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrew Ching & Fumiko Hayashi, 2006. "Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 06-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- Fumiko Hayashi, 2013. "The new debit card regulations: effects on merchants, consumers, and payments system efficiency," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 89-118.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.