Reflections on Incentive Regulation
AbstractThis paper reviews in turn the papers in this Symposium on incentive regulation. It adduces the UK experience with incentive regulation, particularly in the electricity sector, to evaluate, amongst other things, the reasons for development and adoption of this approach, the determinants of setting X, and the case for more advanced metering. It suggests, among other things, that price caps can be designed to facilitate the transition to retail competition, that a rise in complaints might be explicable in part by factors other than quality of service, that TELRIC pricing has yet to acknowledge fully the implications of time and lack of knowledge, and that a failure to recognise the impact of competition on quality and variety of service could underestimate the benefits of competition in supply. It recognises similarities and some differences between the UK experience and the accounts of regulators that have introduced incentive regulation in the US.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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- repec:reg:wpaper:606 is not listed on IDEAS
- Evans, Lewis T. & Guthrie, Graeme A., 2005. "Risk, price regulation, and irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 109-128, February.
- David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2012. "Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 19-40, February.
- David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2005.
"The economics of interchange fees and their regulation : an overview,"
Proceedings – Payments System Research Conferences,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue May, pages 73-120.
- Evans, David & Schmalensee, Richard, 2005. "The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview," Working papers 18181, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- repec:reg:wpaper:105 is not listed on IDEAS
- David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2010. "Price cap regulation: what have we learned from 25 years of experience in the telecommunications industry?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 227-257, December.
- Anna Bottasso & Maurizio Conti, 2010. "An Assessment on the Cost Structure of the UK Airport Industry: Ownership Outcomes and Long Run Cost Economies," Working papers 13, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.
- repec:ise:isegwp:wp252008 is not listed on IDEAS
- Starkie, David, 2005. "Making airport regulation less imperfect," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-8.
- Barros, Carlos Pestana & Managi, Shunsuke, 2009. "Regulation, pollution and heterogeneity in Japanese steam power generation companies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3109-3114, August.
- Ulrich Blum & Christian Growitsch & Niels Krap, 2006. "Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?," IWH Discussion Papers 7, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
- Lantz, Björn, 2008. "Hybrid revenue caps and incentive regulation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 688-695, May.
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