IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v8y2012i3p697-718n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decoupled Liability and Efficiency: An Impossibility Theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Jain Satish K.

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Abstract

A basic feature of tort law is that of coupled liability: the damages awarded to the victim equal the liability imposed on the injurer. This feature of tort law is incorporated in the very definition of a liability rule by postulating that the shares of loss borne by the two parties sum to one. In this paper the relationship between this feature of tort law and efficiency is investigated. It is shown that coupled liability is necessary for efficiency, i.e., if a rule is such that it invariably gives rise to efficient outcomes then it must be the case that under it the liability is coupled. In other words, no rule with decoupled liability can be such that it always yields efficient outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jain Satish K., 2012. "Decoupled Liability and Efficiency: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 697-718, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:697-718:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1555
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1555-5879.1555
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/1555-5879.1555?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    2. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.
    3. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kunda, 2021. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligencerules," Working Papers 2157, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.
    2. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    4. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    5. Harshil Kaur & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2020. "Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2388-2394.
    6. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2023. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligence rules," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 119-140, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    2. Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
    3. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    4. Jain, Satish K. & Kundu, Rajendra P., 2006. "Characterization of efficient simple liability rules with multiple tortfeasors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 410-427, September.
    5. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
    6. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    7. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    8. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
    9. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide," Working Papers 2008-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    10. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
    11. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-Sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(4), pages 571-598, December.
    12. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    13. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    14. baffi, enrico, 2012. "The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law," MPRA Paper 42242, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    16. Harshil Kaur & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2020. "Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2388-2394.
    17. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    18. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    19. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
    20. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kunda, 2021. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligencerules," Working Papers 2157, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:697-718:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.