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Self-Defeating Subsidiarity

Author

Listed:
  • Carbonara Emanuela

    (University of Bologna)

  • Luppi Barbara

    (University of Modena and Ctr. for Economic Research (RECENT))

  • Parisi Francesco

    (University of Minnesota Law School and University of Bologna)

Abstract

The subsidiarity principle was formally adopted in 1992 by the European Union to limit excessive centralization of competences. According to the subsidiarity test, a given policy responsibility should be allocated to the lowest possible level of government, unless there is evidence that the central government (the Union) has a comparative advantage in fulfilling the task under consideration. Contrary to its stated goal, the adoption of the subsidiarity principle was followed by a wave of intense centralization. In this paper, we address this paradox by studying the effects and the limitations of the subsidiarity test in promoting an optimal level of centralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Carbonara Emanuela & Luppi Barbara & Parisi Francesco, 2009. "Self-Defeating Subsidiarity," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 741-783, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:31
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1375
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schaefer Hans-Bernd, 2020. "Laudatio: Francesco Parisi," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, March.
    2. Parisi Francesco, 2020. "Law and Economics as We Grow Younger," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-20, March.
    3. Baniak Andrzej & Grajzl Peter, 2011. "Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 405-434, December.

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