Price Is a Better Climate Commitment
AbstractAt the international level, a global carbon price is a better form of commitment to reduce carbon emissions than a system of national caps. Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft outline a price-based approach that is simple, effective, and remarkably affordable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The Economists' Voice.
Volume (Year): 7 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
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- Roberton C. Williams III, 2010.
"Growing State-Federal Conflicts in Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
16184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Williams, Roberton C., 2012. "Growing state–federal conflicts in environmental policy: The role of market-based regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1092-1099.
- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
- Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
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