IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/conjap/v24y2012i1p95-112n5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rethinking Japan's democracy: origins of “hybrid institutions” and their political consequences

Author

Listed:
  • Kohno Masaru

Abstract

This paper advances a way of thinking about the quality of Japan’s democratic polity by reviewing a set of constitutive attributes that define and contribute to its governing structure and processes. In Japan, the basic characteristics that accompany modern democracy, such as rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, individual freedom, and fundamental rights, can be taken for granted. This paper addresses more nuanced features of these characteristics, their historical origins, and how they are born out in the actual working of Japan’s democracy today. In particular, it highlights various aspects of “hybrid” institutions and their political consequences, including the coexistence of conflicting governing principles and the unusual procedure for the selection of the prime minister as stipulated in the constitution. Also discussed are inconsistencies in the electoral rules used for various levels of governments and how they have inhibited the development of political parties and stable party systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohno Masaru, 2012. "Rethinking Japan's democracy: origins of “hybrid institutions” and their political consequences," Contemporary Japan, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 95-112, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:conjap:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:95-112:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/cj-2012-0005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/cj-2012-0005
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/cj-2012-0005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cox, Gary W., 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 608-621, September.
    2. Reed, Steven R., 1990. "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(3), pages 335-356, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.
    3. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
    4. Michael Herrmann, 2012. "Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 63-90, April.
    5. Yoichi Hizen, 2015. "Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems," Economies, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-35, January.
    6. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2018. "Expressive vs. strategic voters: An empirical assessment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 73-81.
    7. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
    8. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
    9. Costel Andonie & Daniel Diermeier, 2022. "Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 683-733, October.
    10. Kei Kawai & Yasutora Watanabe, 2013. "Inferring Strategic Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 624-662, April.
    11. Bharatee Bhusana, Ferris, J Stephen Dash & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "Measuring Electoral Competitiveness: With Application to the Indian States," CESifo Working Paper Series 7216, CESifo.
    12. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    13. Emily Clough, 2008. "Still Converging? a Downsian Party System Without Polls," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 461-476, October.
    14. Arturas Rozenas, 2011. "Constituency size and stability of two-party systems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 344-358, July.
    15. Iain McLean & Alistair McMillan & Burt L. Monroe, 1995. "Duncan Black and Lewis Carroll," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 107-123, April.
    16. Karpov, A., 2011. "A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 10-23.
    17. Michael Peress, 2008. "Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 207-220, October.
    18. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    19. Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2020. "Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 185-205.
    20. David P. Myatt, 2000. "Strategic Voting Under the Qualified Majority Rule," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W07, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:conjap:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:95-112:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.