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The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the 'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes

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Author Info

  • Hazlett Thomas W.

    (American Enterprise Institute, Z-Tel Communications)

  • Ford George S.

    (American Enterprise Institute, Z-Tel Communications)

Abstract

Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the 'public interest' in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent's franchise. While billed as 'level playing field' laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech's cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 1-27

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:3:y:2001:i:1:n:2

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Cited by:
  1. James E. Prieger, 2005. "Endogenous Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation," Working Papers 54, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  2. James Prieger, 2008. "Product innovation, signaling, and endogenous regulatory delay," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 95-118, October.
  3. Prieger, James E., 2007. "Regulatory delay and the timing of product innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 219-236, April.

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