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Abstract

We extend the “no-haggling†result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer’s valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular, we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the “north-east†boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1663&context=bejte
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 4

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:4

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Related research

Keywords: multidimensional screenin; optimal selling strategies; mechanism design;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

References

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1. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   
   • Gregory Pavlov, 2011. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 3.
2. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
3. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
5. Thanassoulis, John, 2004. "Haggling over substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 217-245, August.

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Cited by:

1. Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20103, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   
   • Gregory Pavlov, 2011. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 3.

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