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Interacción de la política fiscal con la política monetaria en el MERCOSUR y países asociados

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Mendieta Ossio

    (Banco Central de Bolivia)

  • Hugo Rodriguez Gonzales

    (Banco Central de Bolivia)

Abstract

A tiempo de formular la política monetaria, los bancos centrales toman en cuenta los principales aspectos que influyen en el logro de su(s) objetivo(s), entre ellos el rumbo de la política fiscal. La evidencia de las últimas décadas en los países emergentes muestra que el sector público ha tenido un papel preponderante en el curso de las políticas monetaria y cambiaria. El objetivo del presente documento es analizar la interacción de la política fiscal con la política monetaria en el ámbito del MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay) y países asociados (Chile, Perú y Bolivia), utilizando los resultados de un cuestionario enviado a los bancos centrales de estos países. En el aspecto institucional, el objetivo principal de los bancos centrales de la región es el control de la inflación, en línea con las reformas legales que dieron mayor independencia a los entes emisores a principios de la década de los noventa. También es importante la independencia efectiva en el control de los instrumentos monetarios y cambiarios, aspecto que estaría relacionado inversamente con el nivel de inflación en la región. Asimismo, la elección del régimen de política monetaria es primordial para un control adecuado y sostenido de la inflación; observándose una gradual transición hacia el régimen de metas de inflación en estos países. Por su parte, el desarrollo de la institucionalidad del sector público en la región apunta al objetivo de reestablecer los equilibrios fiscales, con miras a generar condiciones adecuadas en el mediano y largo plazo para poder ejecutar políticas contracíclicas cuando las condiciones así lo requieran. Para alcanzar estos objetivos, es importante el uso de reglas fiscales, en especial aquellas que tienen una jerarquía jurídica mayor, tal como sugiere la evidencia empírica para la región. De igual manera, un grado creciente de transparencia fiscal es importante para infundir confianza en el estado de las finanzas públicas en cada país de la región. El proceso de coordinación de las políticas fiscal y monetaria es crucial para el desempeño económico de los países. Para ello, en la región se cuentan con mecanismos formales e informales de coordinación, incluidos aquellos que se dan dentro del marco de negociaciones con organismos supranacionales. En caso de un eventual conflicto, la legislación existente en la región da facultades a las autoridades monetarias para responder según las circunstancias. En esa línea, un banco central está interesado en el constante monitoreo de la posición fiscal, tanto debido a los efectos que podría tener en la inflación como por eventuales necesidades de financiamiento. La mayoría de los bancos centrales de la región utilizan distintos criterios de evaluación del estado de las finanzas públicas, aunque generalmente se prefieren los balances globales sin ajustes por actividad o modificación de precios relativos. También es frecuente que se realicen proyecciones de las principales categorías de las finanzas públicas para evaluar las trayectorias temporales de la situación fiscal y sus posibles efectos en las variables monetarias. Para evitar que surja una situación de "dominancia fiscal", los bancos centrales evalúan frecuentemente la evolución de indicadores de sostenibilidad de las cuentas fiscales, verificando que determinados coeficientes (como deuda a PIB o exportaciones) se encuentren en un rango razonable y con una trayectoria decreciente en el tiempo. El panorama regional muestra perspectivas de una gradual mejoría en los criterios de sostenibilidad, aunque a ritmos diversos. Además, existen factores que modifican los criterios de sostenibilidad en el tiempo; especialmente movimientos cambiarios, garantías implícitas a operaciones públicas y privadas y programas de reestructuración de deuda. Otro canal fundamental se refiere a la reacción de determinadas variables económicas a cambios en la política fiscal. Las principales variables que se verían afectadas serían la demanda agregada y los tipos de cambio (nominal y real), incidiendo de esa forma, en la inflación, objetivo último y principal de la política monetaria. Frente a una modificación importante de la política fiscal, generalmente la política monetaria respondería en función a los posibles efectos en la inflación, especialmente a través de operaciones de mercado abierto que limiten el crédito monetario al gobierno central. La experiencia en política fiscal contracíclica es limitada, aunque se ha logrado avanzar en años recientes. La evidencia señala que, con excepciones, la capacidad de utilizar políticas fiscales para mitigar el ciclo se ha visto limitada por el grado de endeudamiento público. En la mayoría de los casos el carácter de la política fiscal ha sido procíclico, contribuyendo a acentuar, en vez de mitigar, el ciclo económico.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Mendieta Ossio & Hugo Rodriguez Gonzales, 2005. "Interacción de la política fiscal con la política monetaria en el MERCOSUR y países asociados," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 8(1), pages 49-97, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:49-97
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    política fiscal; política monetaria; coordinación de políticas;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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