Overtime Work As A Signaling Device
AbstractThis paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in fact a signaling component. Variations in collectively bargained hours between industries are exploited, as they imply different overtime thresholds for workers with the same number of actual hours. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study for the years 1993â2004, a positive signaling value of unpaid overtime is found for West German workers. --
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0036-9292
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Other versions of this item:
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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