New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration
AbstractA Proportional Hazards Specification for cabinet duration data is estimated by mean of a flexible parametric approach. The hazard rate is found to be significantly affected by the majority status, the degree of fragmentation and ideological homogeneity of the coalition, the stability and the polarisation of the legislature and the time horizon at the moment of cabinet formation. Interesting innovative results concern the higher stability of cabinets supported by coalitions ideologically closer to the median party and/or left-oriented. The overall state of the economy also has a role. Graphical evidence suggests that the underlying distribution of duration data might be a Gompertz distribution. Copyright 2002 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 49 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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