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The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index

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  • Tavelli, Henry
  • Tullio, Giuseppe
  • Spinelli, Franco

Abstract

In an earlier paper in this journal, D. Masciandaro and F. Spinelli computed an index of central bank independence for a number of countries on the basis of the institutional arrangements in place in 1990. Since then the situation has changed and therefore that work needs an updating. This shows that the Bundesbank remains the most independent central bank, but several other central banks have increased their independence: see the cases of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. The Bank of Spain has registered the biggest improvement and the Bank of Portugal remains the least independent. Copyright 1998 by Scottish Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 341-44

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:341-44

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Cited by:
  1. Femke Esch & Eelke Jong, 2013. "Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 631-648, December.
  2. Ourania Dimakou, 2010. "Central Bank Independence, Bureaucratic Corruption and Fiscal Responses - Empirical Evidence," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics 1012, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  3. Franco Spinelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2006. "Maastricht: New and Old Rules," Working Papers, University of Brescia, Department of Economics ubs0614, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  4. Wolf, Marvin, 2013. "Währungsunionen und Allmendeproblem," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP), Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät dp-521, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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