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Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jensen, Henrik
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This paper qualifies K. Rogoff's (1985) famous result that international monetary policy cooperation is counterproductive. In a model similar to his, it is shown that if wage-setters are nonatomistic and inflation averse--as policymakers are--cooperation leads to higher employment and possibly lower inflation. Copyright 1997 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 99 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 73-80
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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:1:p:73-80Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0347-0520
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