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Paying for Pollution: Permits and Charges

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  • Grafton, R Quentin
  • Devlin, Rose Anne

Abstract

Tradeable emission permits are becoming an increasingly important instrument for controlling emissions. For a variety of reasons, emission permits are often allocated gratis, conferring a windfall gain on the first generation of permit holders. This paper examines how a regulator may capture this rent. Four different methods of rent capture--profit, output and input charges, and an emission permit rental charge--are compared with respect to their effects on efficiency and the relative burden placed on 'cleaner' and 'dirtier' firms. In addition to generating revenue for the regulator, certain charges coupled with emission permits may result in a better instrument than permits alone. Copyright 1996 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 98 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 275-88

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:98:y:1996:i:2:p:275-88

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0347-0520

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Cited by:
  1. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
  2. Wood, Peter John & Jotzo, Frank, 2009. "Price Floors for Emissions Trading," Research Reports 94885, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
  3. Pezzey, John C.V., 2006. "Neither the rock nor the hard place: using payment thresholds to balance the politics and the economics of emissions control," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 139892, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  4. Sonia Schwartz, 2009. "Comment distribuer les quotas de pollution ?. Une revue de la littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(4), pages 535-568.
  5. Edwin Woerdman, 2000. "Competitive Distortions In An International Emissions Trading Market," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 337-360, December.
  6. E. Woerdman & O. Couwenberg & A. Nentjes, 2009. "Energy prices and emissions trading: windfall profits from grandfathering?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 185-202, October.

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