It is well known that destination and reciprocal restricted origin tax regimes are only equivalent under very stringent conditions. An alternative nonreciprocal restricted origin regime is proposed and then shown to be equivalent to the destination regime under a wide set of conditions, including imperfect competition and transport costs. The policy implications of the result for the European Community are discussed. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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