The role of seniority in efficient compensation and employment arrangements between a firm and its labor pool is examined. Seniority is treated as an endogenous factor in a dynamic model with uncertainty. Nonseparability over time in preferences and production emerges as a pivotal aspect of seniority provisions in efficient allocations. The analysis focuses on two dynamic factors that have been emphasized in the literature: nonseparable worker preferences in leisure and a learning-by-doing process of human capital accumulation. Copyright 1992 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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