Strike Threats and the Bargaining Power of Insiders
AbstractA two-year period model consisting of a capitalist and an insider worker (who cannot be replaced) is introduced. During the first period the parties accumulate strategic stocks (inventory and strike fund, respectively) which can be used during a potential strike in the beginning of the second period. Each party then calculates the "ex ante" outcome of a strike and the costs of disagreement; with perfect information no strikes will occur. The conditions for the credibility of strike threats and the equilibrium wage proposals of the parties are derived. The bargaining power of the worker is shown to be positively related to the storage cost, fixed costs and the profitability of the firm. Copyright 1991 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 93 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lai, Ching-chong & Chang, Juin-jen & Chang, Wen-ya, 2001. "Currency devaluation in an open-shop union," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 61-74.
- Goerke, Laszlo & Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "On strike insurance," Discussion Papers 12, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
- Corneo, G., 1992.
"Semi-Unionized Bargaining with Endogenous Membership and Management Opposition,"
DELTA Working Papers
92-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Giacomo Corneo, 1993. "Semi-unionized bargaining with endogenous membership and management opposition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 169-188, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.