A special type of the investment cycles that occur in certain socialist economies, e.g., the Soviet Union, is modeled. The ratios of starts and commitments to the GDP fluctuate, while those of investment and net imports are constant. Since starts and commitments are seldom observed, these fluctuations are assigned the attribute hidden. The main results are as follows: (1) hidden investment cycles are compromises between two conflicting goals: reducing tension and stabilization; and (2) existence of cost overrun is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of cycles. Copyright 1989 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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