The Persistence and Indeterminancy of Unemployment in Search Equilibrium
AbstractExisting theories that explain persistent and indeterminant unemployment are brought together within the unifying framework of search equilibrium. External economies that exhibit increasing return to production and exchange are identified as potential causes for both the indeterminacy and the persistence of unemployment for a wide range of assumptions about wage determination. Those considered include a "market-clearing" wage, an "efficiency" wage, and an "insider-outsider" wage model. Although either of the non-market-clearing specifications can induce greater persistence, multiple equilibria require increasing returns in the technologies of either production or exchange. Copyright 1989 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 91 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
Other versions of this item:
- Dale T. Mortensen, 1988. "The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 810, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Howitt, Peter & McAfee, R Preston, 1987. "Costly Search and Recruiting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 89-107, February.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1986.
"Efficiency Wages Versus Insiders and Outsiders,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
133, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-39, May.
- P. Diamond, 1980.
"Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment and Efficiency,"
257, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1981. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 798-812, August.
- Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986.
"Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem,"
427, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Howitt, Peter, 1988. "Business Cycles with Costly Search and Recruiting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 147-65, February.
- Pissarides, Christopher A, 1984. "Search Intensity, Job Advertising, and Efficiency," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 128-43, January.
- Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Beyond the Natural Rate Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 182-87, May.
- Weitzman, Martin L, 1982. "Increasing Returns and the Foundations of Unemployment Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 787-804, December.
- Pissarides, Christopher A, 1987. "Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 473-83, July.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.