Allocation of Capital and Labor in a Labor-Owned Firm Consisting of Heterogeneous Workers
AbstractThis paper focuses on conflicts that may arise in a labor-owned firm consisting of heterogeneous workers. The firm is financed by vote-carrying shares held by the worker-members. Collusive decisions on income sharing and recruitment policy are analyzed. In another separate stage, it is shown how individual workers' supplies of labor and capital depend on characteristics such as their attitudes towards risk. On the basis of these analyses, conditions for unanimous decision-making are discussed. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 90 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
Other versions of this item:
- Askildsen, J.E., 1988. "Allocation Of Capital And Labour In A Labour-Owned Firm Consisting Of Heterogeneous Workers," Papers 10-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.