Profit Sharing, Unions and Investments
AbstractThe pay parameters in a profit-sharing system are likely to be determined by collective bargaining between unions and employers. In this case, employment will not necessarily be higher under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system. For a fixed capital stock, the most likely case is that profit sharing is better for unions and worse for employers than a fixed wage system. With endogenous investments, both parties may be worse off under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system. This might be one of the reasons why the authors in fact do not observe much profit sharing under collective bargaining. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 90 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
Other versions of this item:
- Hoel, M. & Moene, K.O., 1988. "Profit Sharing, Unions And Investments," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 29/1988, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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- Tim Jenkinson & Sandeep Bhargava, 1996. "Partage explicite ou implicite du profit dans la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 19-29.
- Pablo GonzÃ¡lez, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de EconomÃa Aplicada, Universidad de Chile 151, Centro de EconomÃa Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Asheim, G.B. & Strand, J., 1989.
"Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts,"
Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics
08/1989, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Strand, J., 1988. "Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 12/1988, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Asheim, G.B. & Strand, J., 1989. "Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- 10-89, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Michaelis, Jochen, 1997. "On the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 113-118, November.
- Jan SÃ¸rensen, 1992. "Profit-sharing in a unionized cournot duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 151-167, June.
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