Commitment in Procurement Contracting
AbstractLimited commitment causes inefficient production and source selecti on in a multistage procurement process wherein the contractor has privat e information about uncertain costs. A contractor's limited liability l eads a monopsonist to rely more on quantity distortions to extract rents. Moreover, sequential contracting makes it difficult for the buyer to identify the most efficient supplier. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 90 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
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- Parlane, S., 1998.
"Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability,"
98/3, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
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