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Incentive Compatible Trade Policies

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  • Feenstra, Robert C

Abstract

A two-country trade model with production uncertainty is considered. If complete contingent markets do not exist, it is desirable for governments to adopt some trade policies to share the production risk. A full-information policy involves incomes transfers across co untries, which can be achieved by equal import tariffs and export sub sidies. With incomplete information, the author considers incentive c ompatible trade policies, which are designed to be truth revealing wh ile partially sharing the production risk. In this case, the tariff i n one country may differ from the export subsidy abroad. Copyright 1987 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 89 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 373-87

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:89:y:1987:i:3:p:373-87

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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References

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  1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," NBER Working Papers 0797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Azariadis, Costas & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
  3. Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
  4. Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 223-46, April.
  5. Helpman, Elhanan & Razin, Assaf, 1978. "Welfare Aspects of International Trade in Goods and Securities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 489-508, August.
  6. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 1635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Is financial openness bad for education? A political economy perspective on development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 891-903, May.
  2. Christophe Gouel & Sébastien Jean, 2012. "Optimal Food Price Stabilization in a Small Open Developing Country," Working Papers 2012-01, CEPII research center.
  3. J. David Richardson, 1987. "International Coordination of Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 2293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Gaisford, James D. & Kerr, William A., 1992. "Which Country Loses The Least In A Trade War?," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 36(03), December.
  5. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
  6. Richard A. Jensen & Marie Thursby, 1990. "Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 2959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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