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Lobbying Bureaucrats

Author

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  • Morten Bennedsen
  • Sven E. Feldmann

Abstract

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2006. "Lobbying Bureaucrats," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 643-668, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:4:p:643-668
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00473.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
    2. Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    4. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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