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Family Altruism and Incentives

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  • Roberta Gatti

Abstract

This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non-negativity constraints are not binding. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2005 .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 107 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 67-81

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:107:y:2005:i:1:p:67-81

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Cited by:
  1. Fernandes, A., 2000. "Altruism with Endogenous Labor Supply," Papers 0002, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  2. Schüler, Dana, 2007. "Incentive Effects of Transfers within the Extended Family: The Case of Indonesia," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 29, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  3. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "A Theory of Educational Inequality Family and Agency Costs," MPRA Paper 17434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ana Fernandes, 2011. "Altruism, labor supply and redistributive neutrality," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 1443-1469, October.
  5. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 60-82, March.
  6. G�nther Fink & Silvia Redaelli, 2005. "Understanding Bequest Motives An Empirical Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers," DNB Working Papers 042, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  7. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00318870 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory," MPRA Paper 17886, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Kinship, Incentives and Evolution," Working Papers hal-00435431, HAL.
  10. François-Charles Wolff, 2006. "Parental transfers and the labor supply of children," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 853-877, October.
  11. Gradstein, Mark, 2008. "Endogenous Reversals of Fortune," IZA Discussion Papers 3469, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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