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Is Environmental Dumping Greater When Plants Are Footloose?

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  • Ulph, Alistair
  • Valentini, Laura
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    Abstract

    We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two different move structures--where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game. Copyright 2001 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 103 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 673-88

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:4:p:673-88

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    Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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    Cited by:
    1. Jota Ishikawa & Toshihiro Okubo, 2008. "Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-013, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Product Market Integration and Environmental Policy Coordination in An International Duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 34(4), pages 535-563, August.
    3. Robert Elliott & Ying Zhou, 2013. "Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(1), pages 141-158, May.
    4. Takeshi Iida & Kenji Takeuchi, 2010. "Policy-Induced Environmental Technology Transfer," Discussion Papers 1008, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    5. Takeshi Iida & Kenji Takeuchi, 2011. "Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(2), pages 159-190, October.
    6. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Anuj J. Mathew & Arijit Mukherjeea, 2011. "Strict environmental policy: An incentive for FDI," Faculty Working Papers 08/11, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    7. T. Verbeke & M. De Clercq, 2003. "Environmental policy uncertainty, policy coordination and relocation decisions," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 03/208, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    8. Alireza Naghavi, 2005. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade Obligations: A Theoretical Analysis of the Doha Proposal," Working Papers 2005.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Alireza Naghavi, 2008. "Trade Sanctions and Green Trade Liberalization," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 011, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
    10. Francesca Sanna-Randaccio & Roberta Sestini & Ornella Tarola, 2014. "Unilateral Climate Policy and Foreign Direct Investment with Firm and Country Heterogeneity," Working Papers 2014.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Yasuyuki Sugiyama & Muneyuki Saito, 2008. "Ecological dumping under foreign investment quotas," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    12. Yasuyuki Sugiyama & Muneyuki Saito, 2009. "Ecological dumping under foreign investment quotas," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(2), pages 137-153, November.
    13. van 't Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Environmental federalism and environmental liability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 105-119.
    14. Eerola, Essi, 2006. "International trade agreements, environmental policy, and relocation of production," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 333-350, November.

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