This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Dividing the Oils: Dynamic Bargaining as Policy Formation in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Laura Hosman
Abstract

In academic studies of the interface between developing countries and large multinational oil corporations, scholars have noted that over time and through repeated interaction, the developing countries tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves: they progress along a learning curve by incrementally improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction. This phenomenon can be demonstrated in a number of oil-rich developing countries. Nigeria's case, however, is more complex. During the two decades following its independence, the state successfully negotiated for more control over-made strides in the developing of the skills necessary to manage-its petroleum industry, as our model would predict. Then, in a puzzling late-1970s-to-mid-1980s change of course, the government abruptly gave back concessions, undermined local entrepreneurial endeavors, and repealed indigenization laws. This paper combines, in the analytic narrative tradition, the case study method with an extensive form game; it applies a dynamic bargaining model to Nigeria's historical experience, demonstrating that Nigeria improved its outcomes and ascended along the "bargaining learning curve," only to reverse policy and "unlearn," with serious consequences for the Nigerian population. Even so, the demonstration of both successful and improved outcomes in past negotiations give evidence that Nigeria could once again ascend its bargaining learning curve if the government were to re-commit to such a policy. Copyright 2009 by The Policy Studies Organization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2009.00408.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Policy Studies Organization in its journal Review of Policy Research.

Volume (Year): 26 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Pages: 609-632
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:26:y:2009:i:5:p:609-632

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=1541-132x

Order Information:
Web: http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=1541-132x

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.