This paper shows that the "price wars during booms" logic of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) provides an explanation of contagious currency crises. The idea is as follows. When a group of countries relies on exports to a common foreign market, pressures for competitive devaluations arise. In response, competing exporters peg their exchange rates to the currency of their export market. However, it must be in each country's self-interest to adhere to its peg, and a common adverse external shock can make an existing (implicitly) cooperative arrangement unenforceable. Maintaining the arrangement requires a collective devaluation that reduces the unilateral incentive to devalue. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2001) Issue (Month): 1 (February) Pages: 68-80 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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