Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies
AbstractThis paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large-country Grossman-Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political-support effects can offset terms-of-trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation. Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 8 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576
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