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Profit Share and Partner Choice in International Joint Ventures

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  • Litao Zhong
  • Sajal Lahiri

Abstract

This paper suggests a new approach to the determination of profit allocation between the partners in international joint ventures (IJVs). We also examine the issue of partnership choice. The foreign firm gives a large share of profits to its partner and in return receives a better tax treatment from the host government. Under linearity of costs and demand functions, it would choose the more efficient domestic firm as an IJV partner, and the domestic firms would happily accept the offer of partnership from the foreign firm. However, the host government, under certain situations, may persuade the foreign firm, by a suitable lump‐sum transfer, to form a partnership with the less efficient firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Litao Zhong & Sajal Lahiri, 2010. "Profit Share and Partner Choice in International Joint Ventures," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 552-561, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:18:y:2010:i:3:p:552-561
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00911.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dapeng Cai & Yukio Karasawa‐Ohtashiro, 2021. "Why Do Mandated International Joint Ventures Still Exist?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 236-247, January.
    2. Yamada, Mai, 2016. "The Optimal Trading Partner for an Upstream Monopolist," MPRA Paper 70325, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cai, Dapeng & Karasawa-Ohtashiro, Yukio, 2018. "Greenfield, merger and acquisition, or export? Regulating the entry of multinational enterprises to a host-country market," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 397-407.
    4. Sanjo, Yasuo, 2013. "Country size and tax policy for international joint ventures in an integrated market," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 37-53.

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