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Would NAFTA have been Approved by the House of Representatives under President Bush? Presidents, Parties, and Trade Policy

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  • Christopher Sean Patrick Magee

Abstract

This paper examines five trade policy votes in the United States House of Representatives, one during each of the last five presidential terms. The paper investigates the determinants of representative voting and shows that Congress members are more likely to support trade liberalization if the President is a member of their own party. The estimation allows a prediction to be made of the likely House trade votes under alternative presidential election outcomes. The model predicts that the probability of NAFTA being approved would have been greatly reduced by a victory for President Bush (41) in the 1992 election. Neither the trade promotion authority granted to President Bush (43) in 2001 nor the CAFTA signed in 2005 would likely have been approved under Democratic Presidents.

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  • Christopher Sean Patrick Magee, 2010. "Would NAFTA have been Approved by the House of Representatives under President Bush? Presidents, Parties, and Trade Policy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 382-395, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:18:y:2010:i:2:p:382-395
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00871.x
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    9. Baldwin, Robert E. & Christopher S. Magee, 2000. "Congressional Trade Votes: From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track Defeat," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa59, October.
    10. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Koichi Kagitani & Kozo Harimaya, 2020. "Constituency systems, election proximity, special interests and a free trade agreement: the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Japan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 897-922, October.
    2. Lake, James, 2015. "Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-101.
    3. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2017. "Electoral motives, constituency systems, ideologies, and a free trade agreement: The case of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 51-66.
    4. Im Hyejoon & Sung Hankyoung, 2011. "Empirical Analyses of U.S. Congressional Voting on Recent FTA," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-37, December.
    5. Lake, James & Millimet, Daniel L., 2016. "An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 156-178.
    6. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2019. "Electoral rules and free trade agreements as a campaign issue: The case of political disputes over the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 126-137.
    7. repec:smu:ecowpa:1405 is not listed on IDEAS

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